



Comparison of Cultural, Symbolic, Social and Economic Capitals of the Clergy in the Safavid and Qajar Periods

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Abstract:

The present study intends to examine the capitals of the clergy in the Safavid and Qajar periods and then compare the two periods using Pierre Bourdieu's theory. To examine this issue, this question arises that What changes and developments have taken place on the capitals of the clergy in the Qajar period compared to the Safavid period? The hypothesis of the article is that due to this fact that during the Qajar period, reforms and renovations were carried out by modernists in various fields, the capitals held by the clergy since the Safavid period were threatened and restricted. Thus, the symbolic, cultural, economic and social capital of the clergy in the Qajar period has decreased compared to the Safavid period and has faced threats. The present study intends to examine these developments with a comparative approach.

Keywords: Clergy, Capitals, Pierre Bourdieu, Fields, Safavid, Qajar

Introduction

Since the formalization of the Shiite religion in the Safavid period, the clergy have faced many ups and downs. During the Safavid period, part of the political power with the necessary financial support was transferred to the Shiite clergy by the government. At the same time, the religious institution was never opposed to the government institution, and there was a mutual understanding between the two. The Shiite clergy in the Safavid monarchy also left important functions for this system and society of that day, ensured social

unity and supported religious political order. The most important development of the Safavid's collapse was the severance of the clergy's bond with the government. With the fall of Safavid, Afghans (traditional Afghans of religion) in a short period of time and then Nader Shah Afshar tried to keep the Shiite religion out of the realm of government and take it out of the vast and pervasive state in the country. During the reign of Karim Khan Zand, he, with a correct understanding of the role of being Shiite in the Iranian society,

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tried to revive the Shiite religion as the official motto of the country. But the actions of the Zand government in restoring and reuniting religion and government at the national level were not enough to improve relations between the clergy and the government. Entering the Qajar period, we witnessed developments in the field of modernizing the society by modernists and reformers such as Abbas Mirza and Amir Kabir. This issue was done in various fields, such as the education system, modernizing the army, making reforms in the legal system, and so on.

Generally speaking, in the Safavid period, there was unity and closeness between the state and religious thought, but the difference was from that state. During the Qajar period, this alliance was never stable and free of controversy. The relative security created in the early Qajar period was combined with the revitalization of urban, commercial, and administrative life, providing the necessary environment for the activities of the Ulama. During the Qajar period, the Shiite clergy were in charge of many affairs of the traditional Iranian society, such as judging, endowments, education, and other matters. But gradually, with the creation of modernization in Iranian society, the power of the clergy was threatened. So this question arises that what changes did the new developments in the Qajar period cause in the clergy's capital compared to the Safavid period? The present study, with the hypothesis that the creation of reforms and modernization in the Qajar period has threatened the traditional capital of the clergy, intends to examine the traditional capital of this class in the Safavid period and compare it with the capital of the Qajar period. In this regard, with a descriptive-analytical approach and using the library method, the cultural, symbolic, social and economic capitals of the clergy in the Safavid

and Qajar periods - are examined comparatively.

1- Theoretical discussion and conceptual frameworks

Bourdieu's theory about fields

Bourdieu's conceptual framework for fields and capitals can be used to examine the classes of the clergy. One of the concepts mentioned in Bourdieu's theory of social action is the concept of field (context) (Pirbaiae, Soltan Zadeh, 2015, p. 75). The field can be defined as a network or a combination of real relationships between situations. These positions are objectively defined in their existence and in the form of the requirements they impose on their employers. It is either through the current situation or through the potential situation of the distribution structure of the types of power or capital that it is possible to achieve certain interests that are in the field (Bourdieu and Qnet, 1992, p. 197). As a result of the process of division of labor and the separation of affairs, the open and macro-social world has been divided into many small and closed fields, including the artistic field, the political field, the academic field, the religious field, and so on. According to Bourdieu, modern society, with its vastness, is divided into small spaces, which he had called fields. Every social formation, through the sums, is made up of various fields that are hierarchically organized. Thus, each field is relatively independent, although it has structural homologue with other fields (Parastesh, 2007, p. 7). Therefore, each field has its own rules that shape the mood and generally the character of people. As a result, people who know these rules, adapt their character to the environment of the field and act accordingly, can achieve success in earning capitals of the field (Jamshidiha & Parastesh, 2008, p. 28).

A field is built from within, based on power relations. Access to goods and capital in these fields is a source of conflict. These goods are divided into four categories: economic capital, cultural capital, social capital (various types of excellent relations with others), symbolic capital such as prestige and social pride (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 229-230). In other words, the field is a social arena in which struggles or endeavors take place in it in order to access to certain resources and interests (Jenkins, 2007, p. 137).

Accordingly, the concept of the field in Bourdieu's political sociology is a key element in explaining the conflicts at different levels of social life. The term capital has a very broad definition in this sense and includes various forms of power resources, including cultural and social capital. From Bourdieu's point of view, different fields of power compete with each other for the acquisition of capital in society (Swartz, 2013, p. 63). Capital, conflict, and demarcation are common and they represent in all fields. From the Bourdieu's point of view, capital plays an important role in the field, and in fact the field is defined by its own interests and capital (Pirbabaie, Soltan Zadeh, 2015, p. 76). Thus, each field is made up of different capitals that actors compete with each other to obtain them. In the following, after defining capital, the most important ones are mentioned:

Types of Capital in Bourdieu's Thought:

The various forms of capital are both our goal and our strategy, which are pursued in each field to achieve distinction and recognition. Accordingly, from Bourdieu's point of view, there are different capitals within each field, which are discussed below. First, the definition of capital is mentioned:

1-2-1: the definition of capital

One of the words used in Bourdieu's sociological literature is capital. Capital refers to the sum of what a person can achieve in a field. Capital is any effective resource in a society where one is able to make a profit from participating in and competing with it (Qnet, 2006, p. 26). Capital is anything that can belong to a person. In the past, it was basically material and completely objective, and it found its place in economics (Khademian, 2011, p. 36). He divided capital into several broad categories: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic, each of which can be divided into separate categories in the light of specific fields (Ghasemi, Namdar Joveini, 2014, p. 9). According to Bourdieu, four types of capital exchange between actors or specific social groups in each field:

1-2-2: Cultural capital

In general, cultural capital is a collection of wealth in individuals that is obtained through education, the acquisition of degrees, and cultural productions. This capital is formed by continuous work and continuous effort, and the people who own this capital have a suitable position in the society (Naghieb Zadeh, Ostovar, 2012, p. 285). This capital can be converted into economic capital and it is the most stable capital among the other ones (Ganji & Heidarian, 2014, p. 84).

1-2-3: Symbolic capital

Symbolic capital is a form of power that seen not as power, rather as a legitimate demand for the recognition, respect, obedience, and service of others. This capital refers to the set of symbolic tools, prestige, respect, and individual abilities in the behaviors (words and body) that each person possesses. Symbolic capital is also the knowledge of distinguishing between goods. The diagnostic

power that comes from cultural capital and how it interacts with cultural forms means the ability to legitimize, define, and value (Ganji & Heidarian, 2014, p. 84). With this capital, it is possible to consider hierarchy and domination as natural and certain things in society. All the capitals are assembled in this capital and provide the domination and legitimacy of individuals and groups in society. In fact, this capital is objectively found with the belief, credibility and trust of others, and its permanence and continuity is also related to the belief of others.

1-2-4: Social capital

This capital is formed from social duties and obligations and is related to the authorities, links, group relationships, social networks (friendship and the like) or organizations in which the individual is located. In other words, it is a network of individual and group relationships that each person has (Ganji & Heidarian, 2014, p. 84). Thus, for Bourdieu, social capital is a collection of real and potential resources that result from membership in a social network or organization (Bourdieu, 1986, 248). In fact, it can be said that it refers to a set of social connections between people and community leaders, friendship and relationships, by which people strengthen their position (Naghib Zadeh & Ostovar, 2012, p. 284).

1-2-5: Economic capital

That is, the wealth and money that every social actor has in his/her hands and becomes an institutional right to property and financial assets, and can be used in the production of goods and services (Ganji & Heidarian, 2014, p. 84). Bourdieu defines economic capital as: the property and luxury goods that belongs to an individual (Bourdieu, 1998. P. 70). According to Pierre Bourdieu, economic capital

is a set of assets that determine economic strength (Abazari & Chavoshian, 1992, p. 64). Usually, a person's economic capital is measured by the types of amenities, whether or not they are employed, the father's job, the mother's job, the spouse's job, the family's income, the way the house is owned, the housing situation, whether or not they have a car, type of the car and generally their wealth (Farhadi, 2006, p. 85). The important point in Bourdieu's view about the types of capital is that the various forms of capital are interchangeable; however, there are obstacles for converting different types of capital (Fayeghi, Bayengani, 2016, p. 130). Thus, it can be said that the essence of Bourdieu's theory of the types of capital lies in the fact that non-economic capitals can also be accumulated, exchanged, and converted into other types of capital (Karrobi, 2008, p. 313).

In the end, it should be noted that the political field is of special importance to Bourdieu, because the political field in Bourdieu's thought is the main manifestation of the competition and the efforts of the agents to excel in this field (Mortazavian & Fattahi, 2011, p. 150). Although the field of social classes is the most extensive field in Bourdieu's theory, the field of power is the most important field for him. The field of power operates in the form of power relations between social situations and guarantees a kind of capital that enables its holders to enter into conflicts over the monopoly of power or over the definition of the legitimate form of power. The field of power, as a meta field is the organizing principle of distinction and conflict in all fields. The field of power designs the dominant social class (Jamshidiha & Parastesh, 2007, p. 11). In general, there are different capitals within each field and there is the ability to change and convert each capital to another capital. In this way, a good

analysis can be obtained to explain the change in the cultural capital of the clergy to the economic capital, which will be analyzed in the next section.

2- Investigating the situation of Iranian society in the Qajar and Safavid periods

The formation of the Safavid state was an important event in strengthening the post-Islamic national government in Iran. Relying on the Shiite religion, which had many supporters in Iran, with many military successes, the government succeeded in establishing the first national government in post-Islamic Iran and formalizing the Shiite religion. The creation of the first powerful government led to the emigration of many Shiite clerics to Iran, and since then, the clergy have flourished. It is noteworthy that before the establishment of the Safavid state, Iran was not the main center of the Shiites; rather, major Shiite centers were located around Baghdad and in the cities of Karbala and Najaf, and major developments took place almost outside of Iran (Eivazi, 2007, p. 3). Since the Safavids needed the cooperation of Shiite scholars and missionaries to promote and expand being Shiite in society, at the very beginning they wanted to attract their cooperation, and since the number of Shiite scholars in Iran was not a lot, they inevitably called for the Shiite jurists and scholars in the Arab lands and summoned a large number of them to Iran (Jafarian, 1990, p. 101).

In general, the policy of supporting Sunni and strictness of Shiite scholars in the pre-Safavid period had led to the dispersal and dispersal of Shiite scholars inside and outside Iran, and centers such as Jabal Amel, Shammat, Iraq, and Bahrain were the gathering places for first-rate Shiite scholars. This required the new Safavid government to support and strengthen the Ulama inside the country, as

well as providing opportunities to invite Ulama from abroad. The formation of a strong Safavid Shiite state was a stronghold and cover that led to the emigration of Shiite scholars from outside the country (Sheikh Nouri, 2014, 8). These cases led the clerics to take control of various cultural, symbolic, social and economic capitals, and this trend continued until the Qajar period. But during the Qajar period, new developments took place that threatened the clergy's capital. In short, the nineteenth century was the century of Iranians' acquaintance with the West and the clash of mental and behavioral patterns of a traditional society with the values and norms of a foreign civilization called Europe. In the first encounter with the manifestations of Western civilization and the observation of progressive civilized Europe, the Iranians found the material and social backwardness of their homeland and fell in love with European industrial progress. The period of the Iran-Russia wars should be considered both a precursor to the Iranians' familiarity with modernity and a beginning of a new historical stage in Iran. During this period, Iranian officials, especially Abbas Mirza, decided to find out the reason for Iran's defeat by Russia. They also tried to reveal the mystery of Iran's backwardness and West's progress. That is why Abbas Mirza, as one of the first reformers, made some reforms. These reforms posed a threat to traditional capital which was controlled by the clergy. The most important of these reforms are as follows: The nineteenth century was the century of Iranians' acquaintance with the West and the clash of mental and behavioral patterns of a traditional society with foreign values and norms of a civilization called Europe. In the first encounter with the Iranian manifestations of Western civilization, the Iranians thought of reform. The most important de-

developments of that period are: Sending students to Europe, creating reforms, creating and expanding new schools, publishing newspapers and magazines, expanding communications with the outside world, translating foreign works into Persian, and forming the intellectual class. These developments led to the limitation of the capitals that the clergy traditionally owned. According to these developments, the capital of the clergy can be examined in this period (Barzegar, 2016, pp. 82-90).

3- A comparative study of the capitals of the clergy in the Safavid and Qajar periods

To compare the capitals of the clergy in the Safavid and Qajar periods, these capitals are first discussed in the Safavid period. Then, by referring to these capitals in the Qajar period, their distinctions will be presented.

1-3 the cultural capital of the clergy

We need to look at Pierre Bourdieu's views to examine the cultural capital of the clergy. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital includes specific skills, tastes, speech patterns, qualifications, and the ability to recognize and use cultural goods through which each individual distinguishes himself or herself from the other people. This type of capital is the most stable capital among the other ones. By examining the social conditions of the Safavid period, the cultural capital of the clergy can be expressed as follows. During this period, the clergy did important work, such as educating the new generation and guiding the people to the teachings of the duodenal Shiites. One of the requirements of this operation was the establishment of schools and religious education in these places. In the Safavid era, many schools were built with the support of the king, the royal

family, officials and the wealthy people. The construction of schools began during the heyday of the Safavid era (during the reign of Shah Abbas I), and continued even during the political decline of the Safavid era (during the reigns of Shah Suleiman and Shah Sultan Hussein). During the reign of Shah Suleiman in Isfahan, the Safavid capital, about fifty schools of dominant religious thought among the schools of this period were duodenal Shiite, and scholars and founders of schools, despite conflicts on some issues, agreed that schools should be a place to teach duodenal Shiites teachings. Therefore, the teaching of Shiite textbooks in various fields has become widespread in schools (Bakhshi, 2003, 9). In general, in the Safavid era, the education system was supported by the government and played an important role in spreading and institutionalizing the Shiite religion. This led to the centralization of the religious sciences in this period and overshadowed other sciences; So much so that the title of scholar was applied to religious scholars, especially jurists (Vakilian, 2003, p. 58).

During this period, the Safavid kings, with special motives, the most important of which was undoubtedly the preservation of the throne and the continuation of domination over the land and stability against the Ottoman state, called for the help of religious scholars and specifically Shiite jurists.

They, who considered their goal to be the same as propagating the Shiite Imami religion and Jafari jurisprudence, responded to this invitation with goodness and with the help and support of the Safavid kings, established and strengthened the foundations of religious education to promote Jafari jurisprudence. Thus, this period was one of the most prosperous periods in the education market of religious sciences, especially Shiite narrative sciences. During this period, the

education of children was influenced by religious teachings, especially the duodenal Shiite beliefs. The mosque, which was considered a place of worship, was actually a school. The teacher was usually known as Mullah.

By examining the social conditions of the Qajar period, the cultural capital of the clergy, as well as the dangers posed by the new developments, can be expressed in this way. Generally speaking, during the Qajar period, the education and transmission of culture to the next generation was controlled by the clergy and had no rivals. This was done in various ways: formal education in schools and public advertising in mosques. Various religious ceremonies, the most important of which was the Muharram mourning ceremony, also had a similar function. The ulema monitored religious laws, education and social services, and they had a great influence on scholars and market classes (Kadi, 2003, p. 34).

In general, religious construction during the Qajar period was influenced by scholars. The positions in this construction were acquired with the characteristic of religious knowledge. Mosques, the education system, and the judiciary (religious courts) were run by clerics. They conducted religious ceremonies and managed the individual and social affairs of the people through religious laws and regulations (Ehgar, 1977, p. 336). Dedicated education - that is, learning to read and write Persian and the Qur'an and the religious laws - was the school's work plan, and in most parts of Iran it was the responsibility of mullahs and clerics, and thus the education and culture of Iranian society was almost done by the influential clergy (Shamim, 1991, p. 371).

After the school and the formal education system, the most important educational places were the mosque and the pulpit, which were both the center of community and ac-

quaintance of the people with each other, and the center of moral guidance for fathers and mothers who went to mosques in order to engaging in religious duties, saying prayers and hearing sermons and moreover they took their sons there from the age of five. A number of clerics who held a specific mosque as their base as Friday prayers or pre-prayers used the same mosques as student training places. In these mosques, classes were sometimes held in every corner (Soufi, 2013, p. 75).

According to Polak, a teacher at the Academy of Arts, Iranian knowledge was very low and preliminary in all respects and in all fields. With the spread of modern education, which from the epistemological point of view had a human and worldly basis, the common sciences in Iran, which were mostly based on sharia and heaven, were gradually exposed to doubt and hesitation (Malaie, Tavani, 2012, p. 141). With the formation of new schools based on new sciences and traditionalism, the traditional education system gradually faced with challenges. Therefore, among the measures that endangered the cultural capital of the clergy is the development of new schools and the gradual spread of new teaching methods. However, the intellectual and social atmosphere of the country progressed from the second half of the nineteenth century in such a way that it was necessary to carry out some renovations. Regarding the development of modern education, it is noteworthy that despite the influence that modern schools played in the awareness of different groups of society, the government's gradual attention to the expansion of new schools, given the dominance of the clergy over the cultural and educational affairs, it provoked some typically traditional opposition from the clergy against the government (Barzegar, 2016, p. 85). Therefore, since the Ulama had great power in various

cultural, economic and political fields during the Qajar period, they opposed any violation on the areas under their control (Yazd khasti, 2009, p. 128).

In general, during the Qajar period, several reforms took place, and since most of the affairs were traditionally the responsibility of the Ulama, in each case where a correction was made, the role of the Ulama was necessarily reduced. For example, if the educational system tried to develop new schools, it would reduce the role of scholars, who had long been known as teachers and educators (Barzegar, 2016, p. 85). Although as Iranian society gradually moved toward inevitable connections with Western civilization, scholars tried to increase their role and activity in social and political events, but practically new issues reduced their role. In any case, the Ulama, as the guardians of the religious law and the main authorities, became more involved in educating the people with personal and non-personal diagnoses and motivations in socio-political matters (Ghaderi, 1999, p. 232).

With the gradual development of new schools and the recruitment of skilled teachers, the gap between the clergy and the government become more serious. Tutors, who were often students of old schools, became unemployed, and due to their affiliation with the clergy, the institution became enemy with new schools. In addition, the Ulama created many difficulties for the development of these schools under the pretext of opposing with non-Islamic teachings. The administrators of these schools tried to save themselves from the slander of the clergy by strengthening the religious aspect, such as holding congregational prayers, Quran classes, and sermons (Malaie, Tavani, 2012, p. 141). But these issues did not satisfy the traditional class. In general, it can be said that in the Safavid period, education was based on the du-

odenal Shiite religion, which had the support of the government to establish this religion, because the Shiite religion was recently declared as the official religion. Thus, the clergy were seen as those who legitimized the government. This capital continued during the Qajar period and education was based on Islam. However, with the creation of reforms in the educational system, the formation of new schools and educational institutions based on the progressive sciences of that time and the use of professors, specialists and technicians, this capital of the clergy was limited.

2.3: symbolic capital

From Bourdieu's point of view, symbolic capital means a set of symbolic tools, prestige, respect, and individual abilities in the behaviors (words and body) that each person possesses. The discretionary power that comes from cultural capital and how it interacts with cultural forms and means the ability to legitimize, define, and value. Thus, it can be said that there is a cross talk between cultural capital and symbolic capital in many cases, and its boundaries are not clearly defined and separable. In any case, for the convenience of the work, the division has also been done. One of the most important components for the symbolic capital of the clergy in this period was the holding of duodenal Shiite ceremonies and rituals performed by the clergy as trustees. This legitimized the Safavid system.

Another measure taken to spread Shiite culture among the people was to hold Shiite rituals and ceremonies in various cities and regions of Iran.

Safavid kings, in collaboration with Shiite scholars, held ceremonies such as the celebration of Ghadir, the celebration of the birth of Hazrat Mahdi (hgr), the mourning cere-

mony for the martyrs of Karbala and other Shiite imams with special splendor in the cities and villages of Iran. So that the holding of these rituals has remained until today. They also paid special attention to the affairs of religious places and Shiite shrines; therefore, the tombs of Shiite imams and shrines across the country were rebuilt and restored, and large properties were dedicated to them (Sheikh Nouri, 2014, 14).

We should also mention the dignity, personality and position that the clergy gained during this period. At the beginning of the establishment of this dynasty, Safavid kings relied on their Sufi followers. The soldiers of King Ishmael, called Ghezelbash, followed the king as their high priest which mean the religious leader and the great Sufi. The victory of Shah Ismail was achieved with the sacrifice of these followers. However, the Safavid kings were soon forced to cooperate with the Shiite clergy and enter into a division-based partnership with them. They had to rely on the Shiite clergy to promote their legitimacy and strengthen their social base (Pouladi, 2007, p.140).

In any case, the Safavid government created the conditions for the formation of the clergy and cause them to gradually gain power and influence in society during this period by establishing seminaries and gaining independent economic resources (Eivazi, 2008, p. 3). To the extent that in comparison with other social groups, they enjoy considerable social dignity and rights and security. Iranian rulers, who could easily have interfered with the rights and privileges of landlords or merchants, could not interfere with the affairs and privileges of Shiite clerics and scholars (Bashiriyeh, 2006, p. 14).

At the end of this period, they gained a lot of power and gained some kind of authority over the government. Thus, during this pe-

riod, the clergy reacted to the legitimacy of the monarchy, but this challenge was not violent. The main opposition of the clerics during this period was the weakening of the legitimacy of the government and the fact that the rulers must follow the religious rules of Islam and not to stand against it (Eivazi, 2008, p. 5). Gradually, as the power of the Safavid dynasty diminished, the power of the Shiite scholars continued to grow, and they maintained their cohesion and continued the process of separation between the religious institution and the monarchy (Eivazi, 2008, p. 5).

Due to the prestige and respect they had among the people, and this was due to their symbolic capital, the clergy succeeded in gaining a high social status, which not only legitimized the Safavid kings, but also legitimized the duodenal Shiite religion among the people. By examining the symbolic capital of the clergy in the Qajar period, one can understand the dangers that this capital posed in terms of modernization.

During the Qajar period, the clergy also had a special place in public opinion, which is why they played a leading role in many of the events of this period. But in any case, some factors endangered the position of this class among the people, which are mentioned below. During the Qajar period, scholars were respected by the people and had a close relationship with all the classes. Lambton considers the various classes of people, including merchants, artisans, and farmers, to be dependent on the clergy in terms of the rules of trade, education of children, and other social matters such as marriage and participation in various ceremonies and introduces people as the source of clergy's income (Lambton, 1984, p. 281).

Algar considers two factors to be effective in increasing the power and position of Ulama in the Qajar period: The first factor was

the emergence of a kind of evolution in Shiite jurisprudence that established the role of the priest in guiding and governing society. The second factor, in his view, was the Qajar government, which had exactly the same Safavid ideas about the nature of the monarchy's power, but was deprived of half of the legitimacy of the Safavid state (The Safavids considered themselves the descendants of the Imams). Of course, the Ulama could not ask the government to relinquish power, but they expected them to surrender, even apparently (Algar, 1977, pp. 31-32).

This superior position, which showed the prestige and high status of the clergy, had led to the respect and obedience of the people to this class. This can be seen in the leadership of the clergy in many matters and developments of the Qajar period: One of these cases was the issuance of jihad orders in many cases. For example, the issuance of jihad order by clerics to confront the Russians in the second period of the Iran-Russia wars is one of the manifestations of the high position of this class among the people (Agha Zadeh, 2014, p. 145).

In any case, one of the symbolic tools of the clergy was to legitimize kings and give permission to them for jihad. Sheikh Jafar Najafi, one of the most famous scholars of the time, confirmed the reign of Fath Ali Shah, the second Qajar king, and introduced him as his deputy. Shortly afterwards, Sheikh Najafi instructed Fath Ali Shah to wage war on the Russians. Obedience to him in this way was religiously obligatory on the king. But Najafi's affirmation of the Shah, rather than being legitimized by scholars for the Qajar monarchy, emphasizes the role of scholars as the source of legitimacy according to the public deputy belief. The legitimacy of the monarchy was something special, legitimate, and derivative. The point to be noted

was that during the Qajar period, the rudimentary and news movement flourished. One of the important consequences of the prosperity of the rudimentary and news movement is the extraordinary influence of the clergy in the Qajar period. Some scholars believe that this was one of the misfortunes of the day, when the Qajar kings were forced to call for the help of Ulama in order to gain political legitimacy, make them their supporters and also make them dominant on people (Nafisi, 1965, p. 38).

During the first period of the Iran-Russia wars, the Qajar court gradually saw that Iranian soldiers and people were skeptical of the Qajar aims and refused to cooperate militarily or financially to defend themselves against the Russians. So, in order to achieve close cooperation between the people and the military and tribal elites in these battles, and to turn the war with Russia from a military battle to an ideological battle of Islam with infidelity, and to show that the Russian attack was not an attack on the Qajar territory, but an attack on the Shi'ite territory in order to eradicate Islam and spread infidelity, they tried to seek a jihad order from principled scholars to legitimize their battle with Russia. The clerics and scholars of this period actually didn't consider the Qajar government as a legitimate one, but because on one hand they witnessed the loss of Islamic lands and on the other hand they did not see the necessary conditions for forming a government and campaigning against the Russians, so they consented to the request of Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza, and wrote an order against the Russians and handed it over to the Qajars. (Zargari Nezhad, 2000, pp. 378-380).

Other issues include religious ceremonies and rituals: Women's social participation in social scenes has always been associated with strict traditional dress and moral considera-

tions based on the separation of women from men. The most active dimension of women's social presence in the Qajar period was participating in the Muharram mourning, fasting, and passion plays. Acquiring the reward of the Hereafter, the intention to repent of sins, adding religious information, seeing political figures, clerics, great authorities and hearing their sermons, along with enjoying the joy in public, participating in cooking and eating it, were small motivations that strengthen the presence of women in this ceremonies (Shayesteh Far, 2012, p. 130).

But the symbolic capital in this period was exposed to the risks due to the developments and new reforms. Although the religious character of Iranian society and the tremendous influence of religious beliefs and customs in Iran had given great power to its official religious leaders, modern reforms have put these things aside. One of the goals of Amir Kabir's reforms was to reduce the power of the clergy by weakening the power of the courts, religious law and banning passion plays (Yazd khasti, 2008, p. 128). The dream that Amir Kabir achieved less success was to ban passion plays, which is a public mourning or a different kind of display of Imam Hussein's martyrdom. Passion plays were a powerful instrument that stimulate religious feelings and they were an element of clergy activities. What Amir Kabir hated, once again played a role in the constitutional revolution. When the constitutionalists first sat in the Shah's Mosque and then in the British embassy campus, the passion plays were used to incite and maintain religious bigotry. Therefore, in short, Amir Kabir's actions did not make much difference in the power and influence of the clergy (Algar, 1984, pp. 212-213). In any case, the clergy had great power and influence, and in many areas, such as the judiciary and the education that they con-

trolled, did not tolerate any reform (Yazd khasti, 2008, p. 128).

Also, another threat to the symbolic capital of this class was from a new generation of people led by the intellectual class. This class preached new ideas that was due to their influence from Western developments and new ideas. This caused a wide range of people to turn to intellectual ideas and to reject, deny and oppose religious ideas. Thus, the symbolic capital and the position that the clergy received in this way was seriously challenged.

Another symbolic asset of the clergy is the issue of discourse. Reading discourse has been a they revecommon practice of governments, both in the Qajar period and before. During the New Year, public ceremonies and the accession to the throne and ceremonies like that, the preacher recited a discourse. In addition to the court, each city had a preacher who was considered a great man (Majidi, 2016, p. 11).

The transmission of thoughts and ideas to people requires ways and means that are interpreted as tools of socialization. In this way, these tools create culture in various areas of people's lives.

In the early years of change and reform in Iran, which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution, religious scholars who led the movement took advantage of new methods and tools. However, with the development of new ideas led by intellectuals, the clergy also faced many problems in this regard. One of these issues was the development of newspapers, which, by informing the people of the art of discourse as one of the cultural assets, threatened the clergy. These newspapers played a significant role in enlightening the Iranians. They revealed the problems, difficulties, ignorance and selfishness of the government officials and informed the public about the backwardness and the bad situation

of the county. Finally, they offered a solution by explaining that the Iran's problems were due to the government tyranny, the lack of law, and the incompetence of officials (Ziba Kalam, 1998, p. 376).

Thus, the spread of the newspaper from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards became one of the most fundamental factors in the awareness of the Iranian society. Some newspapers, such as *Qanoon*, *Akhtar*, and *Hab al-Matin*, played a very important role in shaping the modern reactions of the clergy against the Qajar and the spreading the idea of legalism (Beheshti Seresht, 2001, p. 111).

Another issue is religious authority which is one of the symbolic assets of this group. The highest way of communication between the people and the clergy has been through religious authority, which was done by referring to religious scholars to implement individual and even social life. Also individuals and groups who were in contact with this institution have been influential at various times in social, political and economic developments. Therefore, the clergy, on the one hand, has been in contact with the people through the expression of Islamic rules and regulations in the form of religious authority and has tried to socialize the people politically, and on the other hand, people have referred to them in order to regulate their personal and social relations and demanded the expression of Islamic rules. This has provided a link between them forever, and in the constitutional arena, due to the widespread role of the clergy, this influence is quite visible. The Iranian society in the Qajar era should be called a religious society. The principles of the Iranian family were based on religious beliefs, and trade and commerce, and in general, relations between individuals, have been subject to religious rules (Shamim, 1992, p. 368).

In general, it can be said that during the Safavid period, symbolic capitals such as holding religious ceremonies by clerics were supported by the rulers because they legitimized the Safavid rule. These issues had given rise to the high status of the clergy, to the extent that they enjoyed special security. But during the Qajar period, this traditional position was endangered due to the influence of new ideas and the intellectuals. The spread of newspapers was also a rival to the clergy in educating the people during this period. Also, religious ceremonies performed by the clergy were opposed by new reformers, including Amir Kabir. As a result, as in the Safavid period, there was no support from the government.

3-3: Social capital

According to Bourdieu's theory, this capital is formed from social duties and obligations and is related to officials, connections, group relationships, social networks (friendship and the like) or organizations. In other words, it is a network of individual and group relationships that each individual has. Thus, it can be said that one of the most important capital of the clergy in this period was having the position of judge and resolving disputes between the people and even the officials. This issue ranged from the highest levels of judgment to the lowest levels.

During the long reign of Shah Tahmasb I, his religious bigotry and his efforts to attract the cooperation of Shiite scholars to implement Shiite jurisprudence in society, along with the stability and strength gained by the Safavid government after the suppression of the Ghezelbash Sufis, paved the way for migration of the Shiite scholars from Arab lands to Iran. It was not long before that the widespread participation of these scholars in the governmental affairs of the Safavid state led

to the formation of a Shiite religious institution with certain members and with certain functions and positions. The members of this organization were the leaders, Sheikholeslam, Friday prayers, teachers and judges, each of whom was in charge of a religious position with specific functions. In the subset of these positions, there was a group of lower-ranking members from each department, forming an extensive and efficient court network that covered the Safavid territory from the capital to the farthest areas. This system offered functions similar to those at the top of the court structure pyramid on a more limited and smaller scale. The functions of this institution were done in various forms such as Legitimizing the Safavid rule at home and abroad, governing the religious and judicial affairs of the state, creating religious unity in the country by propagating and promoting the duodenal Shiite as much as possible, and strengthening its jurisprudential and ideological foundations, training a new generation of Shiite scholars and jurists, carrying out scientific activities to strengthen and expand Shiite sciences, fight against the oppressive Shiite tendencies and by Sufism and etc. (Sheikh Noori, 2014, pp. 23-24).

In general, during this period, because the judgment was based on religious laws and the official religion of the government was the Shiites of the Twelve Imams, those in charge of the matter, namely the clergy, also became the judges of the matter. This was done in both formal and informal ways. In the formal way, the judges were hired by the person chosen by the king. The informal approach was to settle disputes between ordinary people and at low levels it was done by clerics. Shah Ismail established a position called Sadr to oversee the spread of Shiite. During this period, Sadr, as the head of the religious institution, was of special importance and

position. Its main task was to establish ideological integrity by guiding and accelerating the propagation of the Shiite religion. For this purpose, Sadr sent representatives on his behalf to various states to monitor the religious beliefs of the people and prevent appearing any sign of the Sunni religion (Sheikh Noori, 2014, p. 12). Sadr is also in charge of the religious judiciary. Sadr has the highest religious status in the government and is himself one of the most prominent Shiite scholars. Judicial judges are selected from among Shiite scholars and appointed by Sadr (Safi Khani, 2011).

From the time of Shah Ismail onwards, the Iranian judicial system underwent changes that slightly jeopardized the position of the clergy. But this class was still one of the cornerstones of judgment. The process of change in the judicial system of the country in this period progressed to the point that religious law and custom in the judicial system, which always ruled the judicial system of Iran before the establishment of the judicial structure, became separated. Divan Beigi, as the Minister of Justice, supervised the customary or governmental courts, and Sadr al-Sodor, the Shiite jurisprudence, supervised the religious laws or Islamic courts. Among the various governments throughout Iran's history, the Safavids have been the most successful in concentrating judgment. During this period, it was more common to pay attention to customary courts than to religious courts, so that the judiciary was largely controlled by the king and government courts. This was followed more seriously, especially during the reign of the Great Shah Abbas, and the clergy were generally barred from interfering in matters within the jurisdiction of the state apparatus (Safi Khani, 2011).

The general pattern of the judicial system in the Safavid era was the dual judicial sys-

tem consisting of non-religious judges on the one hand and religious judges on the other. During this period, the country was divided into several jurisdictions that their radius was no more than 70 to 600 kilometers. During this period, criminal cases were handled by religious judges under the supervision of ecclesiastical judge, but in general, ecclesiastical judge were more influential than non-religious judges. At the same time, non-religious judges acted independently of ecclesiastical judges in dealing with commercial cases (Safi Khani, 2011).

During this period, the largest organization in the country was a religious organization. Even the political organization was not as vast as religious organization. In addition, the people depended on this organization more than any other organization. The influence of this system spread from the highest point of the political structure of the country to the heart of each Shiite individual in prayers and mourning. Even the king, who was not a clergyman himself, should be imitated by a Shiite authority according to Shiite principles (Zahed Zahedani, 1997, p. 145).

In any case, judging was one of the most important social capitals of the clergy in this age, and it has earned them a high status and prestige among the people. This continued institutionally in later years and periods. But in the Qajar period, one can see the first threats of reform and the impact of new ideas on this capital. By examining the social capital of the clergy in the Qajar period, this can be clearly seen.

According to Bourdieu's theory on social capital, we must refer to the network of social relations established by the clergy during the Qajar period. Also, their duties, such as judging, are considered as part of the social capital of this group.

In general, the situation of Iran during the reign of Agha Mohammad Khan was still so chaotic that there was no room for much influence of the clergy, but the relative order and security during the Qajar rule facilitated the environment for the Ulama to play their role in the society. By the end of Fath Ali Shah's reign, many of the issues that were repeated in the relationship between the government and the scholars of the later Qajar period had been interpreted. The Shah, motivated by his religiosity and political considerations, tried to compromise with the clergy, but the dictatorship of his government was ultimately incompatible with his claims of devotion to the Ulama, and in many ways this contradiction became apparent. In any case, during the reign of Fath Ali Shah (1797 to 1834), we see the expansion of the court and administrative life and the intervention of many important scholars in public life. During this period, their influence on the events was great, and the Shah's interest in satisfying them increased their determination (Ziba Kalam, 1998, p. 170). In order to gain the support of the Ulama, the Shah decorated the holy places and built a mosque, and selected some Sheikholeslam among them. As a result, some clerics took office and were paid by the government. However, the majority of this group was independent and the government complied with their demands (Agha Zadeh, 2014, p. 147).

From the Safavid period until the eve of Constitutional Revolution, there was a kind of relatively stable power division between the heads of government and the clergy. According to it, the judiciary, registering real estate and contracts, handling legal proceedings, issuing relevant rulings, and collecting religious taxes were in charge of clergy. Political rule and other acts of government were also ruled by the king. Accordingly, clerics

were the heads of nation, and government officials were considered heads of state (Ajoudani, 2005, p. 165). During this period, the clergy formed a large group but they were not united (Tonekaboni, 2011, p. 251). Among the scholars, the role of the three authorities living in Atabat (Mullah Mohammad Kazem Khorasani, Sheikh Abdullah Mazandarani and Amirza Khalil Tehrani) was very effective. Also, great preachers such as Sheikh Mehdi Sultan al-Mutakalimin and Sheikh Muhammad Sultan al-Muhaqiqin were influential among the people (Pir Hassan Lu, 2003, p. 1).

In addition to the influence that the clergy had on social relations, other social capitals, such as the judiciary, could be mentioned. In Shiite jurisprudence, the clergyman has an important role and duties. But most important of all was the role of the Ulama in administering justice. Legislation and the resolution of social and economic disputes were the responsibility of the clergy and the religious courts (Zahed Zahedani, 1997, p. 147).

Scholars in the judiciary, like in other fields, necessarily replaced for the Imams. During the Qajar period, the implementation of religious laws by Ulama competed with the government's judiciary. The duality of the judiciary was inherited from the Safavid era and remained intact until 1911, when the first civil law became commonplace. The courts, which were headed by Ulama, were known as the religious courts and their laws was derived from Shiite law. The legal system was called the customary state or judicial background, and since the summary of the negotiations was not kept and the rulings were not written, it is difficult to know on what basis they were judging. The government gave the judges to the rulers of the cities, based on its needs. In most cases, the functions of the two spheres intersected, so that the judiciary was

such that it interacted between the two. Throughout the nineteenth century, the mutual influence of the two courts and the unknown nature of their judgments have been the main source of conflict between the government and the Ulama. The government's efforts to establish its judicial power meant reducing the special privileges of the Ulama. The Ulama, in turn, could not accept the validity of customary judgment (Algar, 1990, pp. 35-36).

In any case, this dichotomy in judging was an important issue for Qajar society. During the Qajar period, the trial was the responsibility of an organization called the Great Ministry of Justice. There were two types of courts: the religious courts and the customary courts. The trial in religious courts were based on Islamic rules and in customary courts they were according to tradition and custom. The religious courts have special jurisdiction over legal disputes and contracts such as marriage, divorce, and litigation, and in general disputes that have a personal or commercial aspect. They were also specific to criminal offenses and illegal acts. Sometimes handling theft and drunkenness, which was related to customary courts, also entered the jurisdiction of religious courts. The laws of the religious courts were taken from the religious laws, and the executors of these laws were the comprehensive jurists and clergymen. The courts of law were more concerned with criminal matters. In particular, aggressions against the government or public security, such as riots, embezzlement, counterfeiting, spreading rumors, lying, stealing, drunkenness, and robbery were within the jurisdiction of these courts. Thus, during the Qajar period, the implementation of the religious law, which was carried out by the Ulama, competed with the judiciary (Kalami, 2012, pp. 127-128).

The important thing is that as a result of the new developments caused by the arrival of modern ideas in Iran and on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, this capital of the clergy was gradually endangered. For example, after the establishment of the judiciary during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, Article 27 of the Constitutional Amendment declared the judiciary an independent power.

However, Article 71 on the separation of jurisdiction, still recognized the religious and customary courts, which have been the judicial tradition since the Safavid period. According to this principle, the Ministry of Justice and customary courts were known responsible for handling all Iranians' complaints. According to Article 72, the investigation of political crimes has become the responsibility of the general courts (Safi Khani, 2011). The Ulama tried not only to maintain the position and privileges they had gained from Fath Ali Shah, but also to increase them. But in practice this did not happen, the next kings confronted the Ulama and the constant conflict between the Ulama and the next kings continued.

In terms of social hierarchy, it can be said that during the Qajar period, the greatest officials of the country after the Prime Minister were the clerics who were under the name of Sadr Khasa or Sadrat Panah in the lower house of the Shah in his right hand. The Sadr Khasa was called nabob, meaning the secretary of king and the secretary of Muhammad (PBUH). He had deputies in all states and cities, who called them teachers. The rulers could not issue any verdict without their opinion, which was called judicial degree (Fashahi, 1977, p. 147 & pp. 48-49). Each province or state also had a major clergyman who supervised religious organizations and the affairs of the people of that state (Zahed Zahedani, 1997, p. 147).

Therefore, it can be seen how the reforms made during this period endangered the social capital of the clergy, which had been in the possession of the clergy since the Safavid period.

3-4: economic capital

Bourdieu defines the economic capital as: the wealth and money that every social actor has in his/her hands and becomes an institutional right to property and financial assets, and can be used in the production of goods and services (Ganji & Heidarian, 2014, p. 84). The important point in Bourdieu's view about the types of capital is that the various forms of capital are interchangeable; however, there are obstacles for converting different types of capital. We can say that the aforementioned types of capital can be used as a source of income for this class and they can be converted into economic capital. Judgment as a social capital, for example, is a source of income for clerics that makes them financially independent and reduces their dependence on official institutions. One of the most important financial assets of the clergy in this period is endowments. The large donations and endowment properties granted to Shiite clerics significantly increased their economic power. This, along with other factors such as the repression of Sufis and the decline of their prestige among the people, the administration of religious affairs by the clergy and their powerful influence over the institution of politics, increases their influence and prestige among different classes of people, especially businessmen. Since then, Shiite clerics and scholars, while enjoying the political and financial support of the Safavid kings, have also enjoyed a social base in Iranian Shiite society. And their growing connection with members of this Shiite community, in addition to strengthening their social base, also

provided part of their financial needs. Gradually, this paved the way for the formation and relative independence of the Shiite religious institution from the political institution (Ag-hajari, 2002, p. 37).

During the Safavid period, part of the political power with the necessary financial support was transferred to the Shiite clergy from the government, including the Endowment Organization (Mozaffari, 2009, p. 92). In any case, the clergy had special financial resources, including endowments and religious funds. Also, the change in their sciences is crystal clear in the historical evidences and people believed in them. The clergy gained credibility from all three items. The beliefs of the people forced them to pay religious dues such as the five predicable and alms tax, and as a result, the economic power of the clergy was provided. Also, people's beliefs in the authorities of imitation as the general vicegerent of Imam al-Zaman (hgr) and the growth of their scientific methods, made the logic of following their orders keener. Hence, they had an authority which was equal to the authority of government (Zahed Zahedani, 1997, p. 145).

Therefore, it can be said that the cornerstone of the clergy's economic capital was laid during the Safavid period, and this group was able to benefit from many economic benefits. Although this issue continued in later periods and became a special capital for the clergy, but with entering the Qajar era, fundamental threats were made to this capital, which was a prelude to the loss of many actions of the clergy in the Pahlavi period. By examining this capital in the Qajar period, we can understand these differences. As discussed in previous discussions on economic capital, Bourdieu argues that capital is the wealth and money that each social actor holds and is institutionalized in the form of

property rights and financial assets. This capital can be used in the production of goods and services. It was also suggested that other capitals could be converted into economic capital. Thus, we can refer to the judgment of the clergy, that they made a huge income in this way. Also, education, whether traditionally in schools or as a private tutor in people's homes, or in a new way in schools, has been one of the most important incomes of these people. In this way, the clergy have entered into many matters and earned money from them. For this reason, they were considered as one of the richest classes of the Qajar period and they could act as an independent and influential stratum against the government. Another characteristic of the economic capital of the clergy in this period is the acquisition of religious funds. People paid their religious funds to this group because they considered the clergy to be the representatives of Islam and considered them trustworthy. Therefore, religious alms and funds were paid to the clergy and consumed under their supervision (Zahed Zahedani, 1997, p. 145).

Another case is that during the Qajar period, scholars, in addition to maintaining their religion, played important roles in society. These duties include the production of private endowments and the holy shrine of the Imams, the verification of ownership documents, the collection and distribution of various alms and money given for charitable and religious purposes, judging and education. Thus, the Ulama's sources of income were from holy shrines, mosques and vows of individuals, as well as endowments. Some of them also made money through trade. Another thing to note is that the Qajar kings used the clergy to stabilize matters in an attempt to gain religious legitimacy and in many cases dominate the situation. That's why they tried to keep the clerics economically satisfied. For

example, Fath Ali Shah during his reign spent large sums of money to repair and decorate shrines and build mosques, and also gave large sums of money to scholars (Ziba Kalam, 1998, p. 170).

Endowments can also be mentioned. A large number of endowments from the Qajar period were dedicated to the construction of mosques or ancillary expenditures such as passion plays in mosques. Endowment was also one of the issues which was controlled by the influence and competence of clergy. Without endowment, a huge and costly institution of education would not have been established. From the past times, some benefactors have worked to establish a school and develop this institution. But when the new education system was established and all people had to become literate, the need for new schools increased.

In general, during the Qajar period, due to the new developments that had taken place and the new ideas that emerged from the encounter with Western civilization, a new class was being formed inside Iran that did not tolerate traditional issues. During this period, the intellectuals and followers of this stratum, as well as many other issues that arose through this, threatened the capital which was traditionally controlled by the clergy. For example, we can mention the traditional education in the schools, whose guardians were the clergy, and most of the teachings of Islam were taught. But during this period, as a result of the reforms that took place, schools were founded in a new style and new sciences were developed. This led to a decrease in the influence of the clergy and the loss of their traditional erector. This question can be repeated in other cases, such as new trials and tribunals. In any case, the traditional capitals of this class were endangered during the Qajar period, especially

after the Constitution. This issue became more intense Qajar period ended and Pahlavi dynasty came to power and caused the clergy to confront the Pahlavi dynasty.

In a general comparison, we can say that the Safavids considered themselves the deputy of the Imam Zaman. This brought them a lot of legitimacy and prestige, and this legitimacy continued even until the Qajar period. Between the fall of the Safavids and the rise of the Qajar, their credibility was shaken by the emergence of various claimants to the monarchy in Iran and successive civil wars for power. The Qajar could only claim to be the shadow of God; this claim was never taken seriously in the society because since the end of Safavid rule, some clerics had challenged the position of being the shadow of God of the kings. The clerics believed that the general representation of the absent Imam belonged to the comprehensive clergyman, and that the king could not make any claim in this regard. For this reason, in the view of many of them, the Qajar government had no legitimacy and the Qajar kings were just one of their many imitators in Iran. However, the formation of the Qajar Shiite government, which had purged Iran of insurgents and claimed to be religious, could not be ignored by the clergy. The Qajar, too, turned to the clergy from the beginning to fill the gaps in their legitimacy and tried to acquire their support and approval (Agha Zadeh, 2014, pp. 144-145).

Also, Shiite scholars believe that the government should be established only by the innocent Imam, and during the absence of the twelfth Imam, this should be done by the deputies of the absent Imam, who are scholars. In the era of absence, the guardianship of the Islamic society has been entrusted to the jurists by God. There is no doubt that from the Shiite point of view, the only basis

that can have legitimacy in the dimension of political power is the issue of explicit and appointment by God. Therefore, an arbitration that lacks this basis is illegitimate in their view and will be called usurpation (Cheraghi, 2008, p. 2).

In the Safavid period, the rulers called themselves descendants of infallible Imams and were able to establish some legitimacy. But the Qajar government was deprived of the semi-legitimacy that the Safavid kings had gained with this claim. The Qajar kings called themselves the shadow of God, but the claim that their rule was from God had only a formal aspect, so their legitimacy was denied by the Ulama (Bigdeli, 2007, p. 42).

In the Safavid period, there was a close alliance between the government and the clergy, but the supremacy was for the government. In the Qajar period, this alliance has never been stable and free from anxiety. The relative security created in the early Qajar period was combined with the revitalization of urban, commercial, and administrative life, providing the necessary environment for the activities of the Ulama. To this extent, the governmental aspect of the national revival influenced its religious aspect. But in the second half of the nineteenth century, nothing but a series of contacts between rulers and scholars could ever be seen. These contacts were made either by the ruler with the intention of obtaining permission for his government, or by the Ulama to establish their own special privileges or to reduce the special privileges of the government. These relations between the government and the Ulama in terms of importance and volume were expanding throughout the Qajar period (Algar, 1990, p. 80).

In general, in the Safavid period, due to the formalization of the duodenal Shiite religion and the need of Safavid kings for Shiite

scholars to establish this religion, clerics were able to obtain cultural, symbolic, social and economic capital at the same time and have a high status in the social system of that period. This became institutionalized and continued in later periods. But this continuity was disrupted during the Qajar period.

Conclusion

In examining the capital of the clergy in the Safavid period and comparing it with the Qajar period, it can be said that the clergy in the Safavid period due to having the resources of organizational power such as the educational institution, the propaganda facilities, the legal and judicial institution, the endowment power organization, and most importantly, the religion institution itself, have had considerable organizational power. Facilities of normalization, such as education and mass media, including mosques and pulpits, were available to the clergy, and legal laws were drafted by the clergy to support these norms. The clergy also guaranteed the implementation of laws through the judiciary. This organizational power was supported by an economic structure and made the economy of the clergy independent of both political sovereignty and the people.

This was the economic structure that was the most important source of income for the clergy until the beginning of the Qajar period, but with the beginning of the Qajar era, all these capitals were threatened and collapsed. During this period, a new trend began due to the developments in Europe. Progressive thoughts and ideas gradually infiltrated Iran, and reformers and intellectuals, comparing Iran with the West, saw the cause of Iran's weakness and backwardness in traditional institutions. Therefore, by sending students to Europe and following the example of modern institutions and ideas in the West,

they tried to modernize and reform. Thus, new educational and legal institutions were gradually formed that competed with the institutions traditionally held by the clergy during the Safavid period. Reformers such as Amir Kabir opposed the holding of rituals and ceremonies performed by clerics. Intellectuals and newspapers also competed with the clergy in educating the people, thus the authority of the clergy was also challenged in this regard. In general, any reform that took place reduced the role of the Ulama, but in any case, during the Qajar period, the Ulama were respected by the people and their symbolic capital was preserved.

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