



Internal Factors of Insecurity in the Persian Gulf

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Abstract: Since a long time ago, the Persian Gulf security has always formed the focus of attention of regional states and the world big powers. During the final years of the 20th and early 21st centuries given the changes and transformations occurring after the US war and Iraq invasion, the significance of the region from security perspective increased. As a result, several conventions and special dialogs were held by regional states, international bodies, and big world powers regarding the establishment of sustainable security to ensure particular goals and interests. In this research we analyze the sources of insecurity including intra-regional in Persian Gulf.

Keywords: Persian Gulf, Insecurity, Intra-regional, Iran.

Introduction

What are more than any other things long-rooted in the Persian Gulf are the records of divergent measures and steps. Both at the time of the Ottoman and Britain Empires and even at the contemporary era, the Persian Gulf has apparently been witness to functions the mistrust among the regional states accrues out of which. However, the interests of foreign powers necessitate that an atmosphere of suspicion be governed over these countries; this mistrust of course barely emanates from the power and policy of foreign countries. Intraregional factors have also added fuel to it. Inevitably, if the regional countries struggled against these problems, the policies of foreign powers alone could not succeed. In this section, the most important intraregional obstacles hindering the trust-building process leading to instability in the region are discussed.

It can be said that in the Persian Gulf the players acting upon an ultra-system security model follow a kind of divergence. This model emphasizes on Darwinism theory and the adoption of nationalistic policies on the part of intervening powers. This model leads to military deterrence of units, increase of full-blown arms race, and strong militarism in the region whose outcomes include the materialization of "no war, no peace" system in the region and the abuse of superpowers from the increase of tensions and ethnic conflicts. In such a case, the strategic region would be the axis of foreign interventions and the materialization of such a model in the strategic region of the Persian Gulf is a proof to it.

In the Persian Gulf region, none of the regional players has a common concept of the regional sustainable development, security, and stability. This means that each of the regional countries considers the regional issues from its own

viewpoints and through its own specific interests; thus, the mistrust and the lack of mutual understanding have led to the unsustainability of development and instability and insecurity in the region. The political, economic, social and cultural incompatibility, and territorial and border disputes have promoted the regional states to seek the regional security among the ultra-regional elements; this has then paved the ground for foreign powers to be present in the region.

1. Border and Territorial Differences and Disputes

Border or territorial disputes in continental shelf, in sea and land, exist. There is possibly no country in the Persian Gulf not to have problems with its neighbors. The most intensified example is that of Iraq and Kuwait whose dispute has existed during the decade years and before.

Borderlines are conventional and creditable lines designated to identify the limits of a political unit on the earth. Political lines are the most important factors for distinguishing an organized political unit from the other. The very lines give rise to the political unity in a land where no natural or human unity can be imagined. International borderlines play a considerable role in forging political and economic relations among states. In principle, a two-stage process should be taken for borderlines to be identified. In the first stage, the limits are pinpointed: borderlines are drawn on the map and then stipulated in the contract. In the second stage, the borderlines according to what appeared in the contract are demarcated on the ground. It is interesting to note that, out of 10 ground borderlines between the Persian Gulf states, the borderlines between Saudi Arabia and Yemen has not yet undergone the first stage. The borderlines, in addition to indicating the limits of a state, also identify the powers limit of that state. (Mir Heidar, 1992)

The geopolitical region of the Persian Gulf is a complex example of such border disputes each of which can trigger a full-fledged war. For instance, Iraqi aggression upon Iran on the 22nd September 1980 and its aggression on Kuwait in 1991 both were caused by Iraq's claims over the settled border disputes. The most significant border and territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf include:

1. Iran-Iraq dispute over Arvand Rood
2. Iran-Kuwait dispute over the sea border between the two
3. Iran- U.A.E dispute over their sea border, Tonb-e-Bozorg and Kochak and AbuMus-Oman dispute over the sea border between the two and the territorial border in some parts of Raas Al-Kheime and Sharja
4. U.A.E-Qatar dispute over Halwul and some other islands
5. U.A.E.-Saudi Arabia dispute over the sea border between the two
6. Iraq-Kuwait dispute over the whole territory of Kuwait
7. Saudi Arabia- Kuwait dispute over Qaru and Omolmaradim islands and the sea border between the two
8. Yemen- Saudi Arabia abundant territorial disputes
9. Saudi Arabia - Qatar dispute over the sea border between the two in Solva Gulf
10. Bahrain-Qatar dispute over their common sea border and Havar Complex Islands
11. Saudi Arabia - U.A.E. dispute over their common sea border
12. 12 border and territorial disputes among the 7 members of U.A.E. (Jafari Valdani, 1994, 13)

Regarding the border disputes it is claimed that the concept of border is a strange phenomenon in the Persian Gulf. In fact, borders between countries in the region are demarcated not by borderlines but borderlands (regional bordering).

The above-mentioned disputes are in fact unsettled border and territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, there are many tensions and conflicts over the apparently settled border disputes each of which can be influential in a war to break. Out of about 15 sea borders between the regional states, 10 have not been yet demarcated three of which are Iran's sea borders with Iraq, Kuwait, and U.A.E. Iran-U.A.E dispute over AbuMusa and Tonb islands, during the last three years strongly followed by U.A.E, is one of the most significant border disputes in the region. Although there are many reasons for such a territorial dispute, the political reason is the main cause of U.A.E. claim over these Iranian islands.

For a better perception, it is necessary for border and territorial disputes to be defined here. By the border dispute it is meant that there is no agreement over the exact border demarcation, and the territorial dispute refers to the disagreement over territories and lands to be owned by one or the other state. (Jafari Valdani,1991: 209) The border and territorial disputes are the most important factors bringing the trust-building process in the Persian Gulf to a deadlock. Such disputes have already played a considerable role in forging political and economic relations between the Persian Gulf states and repeatedly have also led to tensions between them. In recent years, these disputes have had a major role in impairing the regional security in a way that it has had no precedence.

Some of the regional countries have brought forth some historical events as reasons for their border and territorial disputes. Iraq's goal in the imposed war against Iran was to divide Khuzestan province and capture Arvand Rood; however, behind these geographic disputes: Saddam recalled Qadesie war in his statement addressed to Iraqi public in 28th September 1980: "Significant war of Qadesie destroyed the pride and ambition of Khosro Parviz, removed the

obstacles on the way of Islam, and eradicated ignorance, impiety, and aggression in the region. We should now again unsheathe our swords like in Qadesie war in order to struggle with this cruel group and teach them new historical lessons". (Ramazani,1986,60)

Although such disputes between Iran and countries like Iraq and U.A.E existed much before the 1979 revolution, by the victory of Islamic revolution such claims were brought up and raised again. Anyway, border and territorial disputes are the most important principles hindering the establishment of appropriate security arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

Territorial issues reflect the existing endangering situation in the Persian Gulf; they as the most significant tension-building factors in the region have hindered the expansion of friendly ties among the regional states. The continuity of territorial disputes damages the suitable relations that can govern the region, threaten the regional stability, and intensify foreign interferences in the regional issues.

2. The Arms Rivalry in the Region

The other obstacle facing us is the arms rivalry by which the regional states have changed into the repertoire of different weapons.

It should be mentioned that during the last 12 years Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and U.A.E have respectively signed up 152.522,60 and 20.275 billion dollar military contracts with foreign countries and in recent years we have been witness to huge military contracts of regional states especially U.A.E drawn up with out-of-the-region countries.

The arms rivalry is the direct result of dominant motives in the region. the U.S.A by following the strategy of balance of powers in the region and preventing the advent of a superior power, has paved the ground for the development of the arms competition. By the implementation of Nixon's two-column policy, a kind of arms rivalry was

given rise to among Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia leading to tensions in 80s.

The Persian Gulf is a region which has a great appetite for advanced weapons, and the existing political disputes help the durability of the arms competition. Many experts believe that the oil riches of the littoral states is an important threatening factor building up militarism in the region. Such an idea is considerable from two dimensions. Firstly, the strategic significance of oil has made foreign powers interested in transferring their military troops to the region and executing their forces in defending this critical material.

Secondly, the oil income of the littoral states is the main factor in funding, buying, and developing advanced weaponry systems. However, the point of great significance is that all regional countries having huge arms purchases claim that their arms expenses are for defensive application; in this way they justify their military investment under the pretext of defending themselves against the aggression of the other countries.

The arms rivalry among the regional states is not a competition to achieve prestige and a special position in the region but a strategy resorted to as believed by the regional states to maintain their sovereignty and rule. This has developed a sort of new larger-scale conflicts in which the use of weapons of mass destruction is not impossible. The southern coast states of the Persian Gulf have always suffered from a kind of fear from their northern coast states, Iran and Iraq; such a concern has not yet taken its shadow completely away. On the other hand, the regional states have always sought their political stability in the increase of their military strength: a thought that has not lost its value yet. It is not surprising to claim that the Persian Gulf states have enjoyed the highest percentage of the increase in arms purchase in the world.

By a glance at the situation of the eight states in the Persian Gulf, it would be clear that any state is afraid of the other; as a result, initially development of the military power of the states to struggle against the threats would seem as the most logical solution. Of course, the development of the arms race in the region in itself will lead to a vicious circle.

The category of weapons and the arms rivalry opens a very complex chapter for the national interests of the regional states. As far as the availability of the necessary weaponries is critical to the sovereignty of a country, to the very extent it can put the country in the conflicting point with the others. Any measures taken by a regional state to buy new weapons would incite other states to reach an approximately equal status regarding the weaponries of the former state. The significant point is that the arms competition in the Persian Gulf is one of the most important factors threatening the regional trust-building, security, and integration. After the cessation of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, Iraq aggression of Kuwait, and the attack of the allied forces on Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council was very concerned of the superiority of Iran's military power that caused great damages inflicted on Iraq army during the Persian Gulf war. In the Persian Gulf generally any state is considered a threat to and a source of anxiety for the other state. The origin of all these tensions and anxieties should be sought in the political and geographical maps of these states which have resorted to the arms competition to settle it.

The experience has shown that the arms rivalry and the purchase of advanced weaponries never lead to security; they instead would follow a decrease in the budget of the other economic and social sections, and from quantity point of view would bring about underdevelopment. If we accept that countries of any region in the world are like the rings of an integrated chain that a thrust upon one ring affects the whole chain, we

will conclude that the purchase of new and more destructive weapons encourages other countries to be ready to embark on a very dangerous race; such a race cause of its inherent characteristic makes political and economic pressures get together so that it would lead many countries to find access to the capabilities of creating weapons of mass destruction.

By a historical look at the Persian Gulf, one would witness that the demarcation of borderlines, the establishment of governments, and the appointment of Emirs of Sheikdoms are just some sources of dispute in the region; to exert their control over the governments they have resorted to huge purchases of weapons. The sale of weapons in the Persian Gulf and the transfer of military weaponries to it have considerably and unprecedentedly increased. The member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council apparently cause of their fear of Iraq and possibly Iran have continued buying modern weapons from Europe and other countries since 1990. For example, in 1993 Saudi Arabia signed a 438 billion dollar contract with France to renew Saudi's military radio and communication equipments. In 1993, the U.S agreed to sell 72 F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In February 1993, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed a military contract with Italy. (Pipes D,1993:133)

It should be said that the present militarism in the Middle-East appeared in the second half of 50s after the crisis in Suez Canal, and it was accelerated following 1967 Arabs- Israel war. The 6-day war (1967) was the source of a great rise in the trend of weapons purchase in the Middle-East to date. In the Persian Gulf in late 60s, the big regional countries embarked on developing modern military and well-armed machines; smaller Sheikdoms were then yet under the canopy of the Great Britain.

the increase of weaponries in the Persian Gulf in the second half of 60s was a little less than the arms race across the Middle-East; however, the

defense expenses of Iraq and Saudi Arabia (their economy scale was smaller than Iran economy) was rising more than before. The defense expenses of Iraq consumed more than 10 percent of its gross domestic products in 1965.

Briefly, the model of weapons purchase created in 1970 got complicated by three events in 1979 and 1980: the Soviet Union aggression of Afghanistan, Iran's Islamic revolution, and Iraq war against Iran. All these three events placed deep impacts on the Persian Gulf states and made them take measures to buy more weapons to establish security. Moreover, the Gulf Cooperation Council member states spent more than 100 billion dollars on their defense expenses during Iraq war against Iran (1980-1988). Thus accumulation of arms in the region without the capability of the regional states in direct and independent use of weapons is the indication of the continuous presence and dominance of foreign powers in the Persian Gulf.

3. Social, Economic, Political and Cultural Heterogeneities

The Persian Gulf states on the north and south are different regarding economic and social markers. Such differences are apparent in the field of population, quantity and quality indices in the income per capita in health and therapy, access to public services, cultural markers, etc. It can be said that generally the southern states enjoy a much more favorable economic status. However, the northern states have a better environmental and technological capabilities. Iran with having 70 million population and Qatar with 554800 are respectively the most and the least populated states.

Economic Heterogeneities

Saudi Arabia with 125 billion dollars and Bahrain with 5 billion dollars respectively have the highest and the lowest GNPs. Regarding the oil

reserves, Saudi Arabia with 261.2 billion barrels enjoys 25.9 percent of the world oil reserves and Kuwait with 96.5 billion barrels has 9.6 percent of the world oil reserves that is three times more than the U.S oil reserves. At least, 50 percent of the world oil reserves is still in the Persian Gulf region. (Tschirgi, 1994, 71)

Except Iran and Iraq that have oil-agricultural based economy, other littoral states are dependent on the oil export revenues. In fact, the oil exporting states in the Persian Gulf are divided into two categories.

In one category, the states in addition to oil revenues enjoy a favorable environment for agriculture like Iran and Iraq. In the other category, the southern states of the Persian Gulf with unfavorable environments for agriculture exist. For the since the Arab states in the Persian Gulf have a large proportion of the world oil reserves, avoiding or pursuing political power is equal to losing the economic power. Since almost all the states in the region export a single product and have no alternative to account for their national revenues, they are then strongly dependent on the foreign powers. The governments in these states do not have economic contradictory groups because the economic situation in the society is usually favorable and society is kept in need of the government and since it has no right to intervene in the government affairs feels no duty in this regard. Because of having a diseased economy they are vulnerable when facing a financial crisis.

The governments as such which have made strong links between the political power and the economic wealth feel strongly vulnerable against contradictory groups from in and out of states, and to compensate for this security gap they embark on adopting complicated and well-equipped decisions almost not implemented without the help of foreign experts.

Political Heterogeneities

The political situation of the Persian Gulf states is one of the other main distinctions and significant factors hindering the trust-building process in the region. The political distinctions are divided into the political structure, contradictions in national interests, each will be discussed in sequence.

The rootlessness of the political texture of these countries originates from the issue that their governments were established as a result of the well-calculated policy of the old colonialism of the Great Britain after the World War II and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Among the eight Persian Gulf states, Iran is the only country which enjoys a long history and civilization and has not been formally colonized of any foreign power. Iraq and Saudi Arabia are fundamentally new governments having a lifelong of 80 and other governments in the region are newly established by a length of about 35 to 40 years. (Bakhtiari, 1996, 13-16)

Even in the recent political history of these states from the viewpoint of their reactions toward global powers both during the cold war and today they have appeared differently. During the cold war, Iran acted as the U.S ally and confederate and Iraq was pro-Soviet showing a bi-polar competition in the Persian Gulf. The rest mainly coordinated themselves to be oriented to the west. This situation totally reversed after the Islamic revolution in Iran. Iraq yet remained in the camp of East and the former Soviet Union and took advantage of Iran's contradictions with the west.

The political history of the Persian Gulf has shouldered a heavy burden of differences. Another issue being important in political distinctions is the political structure of these countries. In the North and West side of the Persian Gulf, the tribal and non-democratic monarchies or Sheikdoms are at power. On the whole in the Persian Gulf three different political structures exist: 1) 6 states in the south and west ruled under the absolute monarchies 2) Iraq

where Baath party and social-nationalists governed and now its regime is democratic republic and 3) Iran with the structure of Islamic Republic.

The other point of significance in the political distinctions should be sought in the contradiction of their national security interests. To define the national security of any country, some pre-requisites should be met some of which are put forward here:

- A realistic approach to the happenings in the country, the whole region and the world order. This is one of the most important ways to adopt an appropriate security strategy.
- perceiving and recognizing the factors realizing these events; if they are not clearly and logically identified or are intentionally ignored, then national security would be obscured.
- The lack of political and social narrow-mindedness and the avoidance of backward-view of tribalism. Certainly in any country if the interests of a group or tribe dominate the rest of people's, then the long-term strategy of that country to fulfill the national goals and interests would be a definite failure.
- having an integrated and realistic ideology. If a country has an illogical ideology finally it will be obliged to put it aside; there are many examples in this regard the most important of which possibly is the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Now if we refer to our own discussion of the Persian Gulf region, it will be observed that security of the governing tribe in the social hierarchy is considered as the security of the whole society. As put it, the security is the most vital element in the national interests. The three existing poles in the region have disagreements

over the regional security that are of the important obstacles on the way of the development of the security trend in the Persian Gulf.

Cultural and Social Heterogeneities

Cultural distinctions include distinctions in nationality, religion, language, writing, and culture. The total population of about 115 million in the Persian Gulf littoral states comprises different nationalities, languages, religions and cultures. The population composition of all countries is with no exception incongruous. Iranians, Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis are prevalent in the region. To understand the incongruity of the population structure just suffices to know that in Kuwait, U.A.E and Qatar the number of foreigners is larger than the aboriginals.(Colbertc,1984) Since the population growth rate (its increase, decrease, or inflation) is one of the most important national security factors and in a harmonized geographical setting each one of these factors play an important role in selecting national goals and strategies, thus the lack of harmony in the populations of Gulf states has led to the adoption of policies contradicting the feeling of trust among the states. Thus by comparing the religious and racial distinctions and similarities in the Persian Gulf, this region can be divided into two rather mixed sections: North and South.

In the North, there are mostly Shiites and Persians and in the South Sunnis and Arabs. This has brought up the Arab-Persian thought in the region. Except this deviated thought, there are also contradictions among Arab states including the contradictions among different tribes in Sheikhdoms and among the immigrants and the aboriginals. However, the most important cultural contradiction among Arabs exists between the north Arab countries and their neighbor. This contradiction is still as efficient as before removing trust and leading to divergence. In Iran-

Iraq war, Saddam Hussein exemplified this conflict as one between the Persian and Arabs and used Qadesieh War as an analogy. In Wahabi religion, Shiites are considered renegades and currently in the south part of the Persian Gulf Wahabi is the dominant religion; although at recent years because of peaceful efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran this dichotomy especially in Hajj pilgrimage is not that much manifested but yet a sense of hatred between Shiites and Wahabbis exists. Arabs in some way claim that they have conquered multi-thousand civilization of Iran while refute the fact that Iran's ancient and great civilization has placed impacts on Arabs and Islam. On the whole, from history and civilization points of view, the Persian Gulf has three different civilization identities:

1. the civilization of Iran plateau having relevance with an ancient history being accompanied by the special pride of Iranians
2. Mesopotamia civilization having faced with ruptures in its political history, and
3. the Peninsula civilization that had no civilization before the advent of Islam living like primitive tribes. This region started to enjoy a definite identity after Islam.

Mecca and Medina as two holy and valuable cities bring with them the civilization and religious-cultural heritage of the world of Islam. Anyway, such historical and civilization distinctions have raised a kind of distinction in feelings of the Persian Gulf inhabitants, where 66.7 and 33.3 percent are respectively Shiites and Sunnis. (The World Almanac 1997) In Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, the majority are Shiites but only in Iran the government is controlled by Shiites. The recent changes in Iraq have also given a major role to Shiites in government.

4. Access to Water

Throughout the human's history, having safe access to water has been the main requirement for social and economic development and the sustainability of cultures and civilizations. This point is so important that even if the developing countries take new measures for their development and avoid their past errors, yet it is difficult to imagine a sustainable development while the deficiency and lack of renewable fresh water resources is possible. Water whose purification, transfer, and substitution is respectively difficult, if not impossible and expensive is the only element whose availability is necessary for the manufacture of food products, the economic development, and survival. The issue of improving water quality as one of the primary priorities in transfer of technology from advanced countries to developing ones put forward for the first time in the mid-1993 by the new commission of the UN on the sustainable development was an emphasis on the important role of water in man's welfare and health.

Today, hydrologists and even the politicians of different countries are on the belief that the manner of water utilization in world and its distribution would be one of the reasons for wars being held across the world. According to hydrologists, water is no longer in abundance lacking economic value but a non-renewable product with high economic value in all consumption fields.

Today, the global water crisis even threatens the world security making changes to the concept of national security. It goes to the extent that even the analysts of environmental issues have divided the years amid 1950 to 2030 into two economic and environmental periods. The important point in this categorization is that during 1950 to 1990 the national security had mainly "an ideological and military" concept and the cold war was its marker. However, during 1990 to 2030 the national security would be mostly under the

impact of food and occupational securities and the environmental issues; that is, the hungry and jobless would be the ones who often transfer and immigrate across national and international borders. In recent decades, the deficiency of fresh water has been one of the main reasons for confrontations in the Middle-East or especially in the South-East Asia.

Due to the significance of water in the Persian Gulf, the question posed is why there have not been any binding international agreements and laws about the utilization of common water resources. What is the relation between the policies taken by the regional countries in supplying water? What are the ways in struggling with and removing the tensions emanating from the competitions among the regional countries to make more use of the common water resources? To what extent is it possible to predict a war on the way of achieving water resources? What is the perspective of human and economic development of dry and waterless countries in the next decades and finally what would be the global agenda to remove the crisis?

The Persian Gulf comprising the major share of oil reserves is facing increasing water deficiency. The increasing birthrate has always intensified this problem. Almost all of the regional countries have the resources of common surface and underground water whose utilization has always led to variety of disputes among them. Disputes over the common rivers, the lack of any certain lawful regulation or agreement about the utilization of common water, the lack of bind of those agreements drawn up among the countries having common water areas determining their utilization shares, and the lack of mutual trust and misunderstanding among the regional countries are among the factors effective in the water deficiency and security of the Persian Gulf region.

The problem of water deficiency and efforts to supply the needed water in the region has a long

history; the settlements of people was formed according to their access to security water resources scattered here and there. The rate of rain fall in the region in vast desert areas is less than 100 mm, in margins of deserts 200 mm, and in nearly elevated lands, which is not extensive 400 mm in a year (Buoch,1993,3-5).

The increasing dispute between the countries having the control over resources of the three main water flows in the Middle-East and the countries consuming these waters especially since 1990 changed the region into a potential confrontation.

By probing the disputes among the communities settled in the Persian Gulf region, one observes that the water has always been a factor and instrument making problems. Low and irregular rainfall, low number of rivers, the emanation of big rivers from the south and east highlands of Turkey, and the controversial and vague borders has also added to the tension among the residents of this region. The lack of surface waters in the region, given the volume of surface water flows at the north coastlines of the

Persian Gulf reaching 45 billion square meters in year (The Bulletin of Water Reserves in Iran) makes the water problem more complex. Thus, it seems that the Persian Gulf with the increasing population growth, the inappropriate use of underground waters, and the lack of any serious attention to the water deficiency crisis would be unable in the near future, to supply the water necessary for its agriculture, industry, and drinking. So, it is for years the security of water supplies has been considered as part of the national security of the Persian Gulf and the Middle-East countries. Due to the real aspect of the water crisis in the region, the question posed is what countries would be more vulnerable in this regard and how those countries would be able to supply this vital liquid.

5. Disintegrated Security Structure

Persian Gulf is a region where the security problem is strongly felt. This problem emanates from the total dependence on the idea of "Zero Sum" in security cases. This idea which is very common in the games theory implies that gaining score by one side is equal to the loss of score by the other, or the win by one is equal to the loss by the other. The implementation of this strategy promotes countries to select a non-cooperative strategy since they are suspicious to the cooperation of other countries. So any country tries unilaterally to seek its national security. The access to advanced warfare is the outcome of such an idea. Thus, instead of providing for the regional security through cooperation and mutual efforts, the security becomes a subject for competition. As a result, the regional states, especially the weaker ones, live in the actual fear of threats to their survival and the regional competitions would be indispensable.

To avoid confrontations, the "total-total" approach in which all sides, over a certain case, are either winners or losers can put an end to suspicions and misinterpretations. On the other hand, the advantage of this regional approach is that it would help replace "Zero Sum" by "total-total" approach. To change the Persian Gulf from a region in which security is endangered by theoretical disputes over special issues to a region in which the countries cooperate with one another over such issues or agree in some circumstances, the implementation of "total-total" strategy is necessary.

The security structure of the region has not ever been able to remove the main problems in the Persian Gulf. Such a disability was clear in Iraq war against Kuwait. The Gulf Cooperation Council member states did not take any step against this aggression; they were not even able to issue a declaration against Iraq. To solve the problem, they resorted to foreign powers. It was a good experience for the regional powers to know what the reliance on foreign powers would bring

about. The Americans, for their presence and the resulting expenses were provided with sufficient liabilities by regional states. More than 100 billion dollars as the monetary liability were provided by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and then the U.S ensured its presence in the region. The U.S designed and implemented its military operation in seven weeks while it could do it in seven days. Thus, foreign powers were not at all appropriate supports for the establishment of security.

Conclusion

The fundamental change in the global system of the 90s from a two-pole one with an ideological orientation to a multi-pole system with economic orientation has brought about an unprecedented motivation for all regions across the world to form regional unions or economic categorizations; however, despite complex communications in the Persian Gulf states no important developments have occurred on the way of achieving regional solidarity.

Regional movements after the collapse of the former Soviet Union are significant and the regional states have paid a heavy price in the regard. The mistrust among these countries emanates from such heavy costs, suspense, instability and insecurity that have provided a ploy for the presence of big powers in the Persian Gulf.

The mistrust among the regional states ending to an obstacle hindering the formation of regional unity is the outcome of outer factors existing in the region having placed impacts on ultra-regional elements.

Many factors having implications on the Persian Gulf are the causes of the insecurity in the region. These tension-building factors are divided into external and internal ones. Taking internal factors into account and making efforts to remove built-in obstacles make external factors not to be labeled as causes of the regional

insecurity and the suitable ground not to be paved for them to dominate the region. Thus, tension-building factors or internal and external factors hindered the Persian Gulf states to play their security roles, which were discussed above.

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